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Abstract: MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) is a temporal network, which is managed by autonomous 
nodes, which have the ability to communicate with each other without having fixed network infrastructure 
or any central base station. Due to some reasons such as dynamic changes of the network topology, trusting 
the nodes to each other, lack of fixed substructure for the analysis of nodes’ behaviors and loss of specific 
offensive lines, this type of networks is not supportive against malicious nodes’ attacks. One of these attacks 
is black hole attack. In this attack, the malicious nodes absorb data packets and destroy them. Thus, it is 
essential to present an algorithm against the black hole attacks. This paper proposed a new approach, which 
improvement the security of DSR routing protocol to encounter the black hole attacks. This schema tries to 
identify malicious nodes according to nodes’ behaviors in a MANETs and isolate them from routing. The 
proposed protocol, called AIS-DSR (Artificial Immune System DSR) employ AIS (Artificial Immune System) to 
defend against black hole attacks. AIS-DSR is evaluated through extensive simulations in the ns-2 
environment. The results show that AIS-DSR outperforms other existing solutions in terms of throughput, 
end-to-end delay, packets loss ratio and packets drop ratio. 
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1. Introduction 
Mobile Ad Hoc networks do not have any access point to network accessibility. Wireless devices such as 
notebooks, laptop and cell phones connect to similar equipment and form an Ad Hoc network. Since nodes 
are not controlled by any central entity, they have unrestricted mobility and connectivity to others. Routing 
and network management are done by each other nodes, cooperatively. In other words, the nodes’ 
communications are formed based on the cooperation and some trust among them. In these networks, each 
node works as a host as well as a router that forwards packets for other nodes. The most important property 
of these networks is their dynamic and variable topologies that is the result of the nodes’ mobility [1, 2 and 
3]. Security is one of the main research topics in computer networks. The wide usage of mobile ad hoc 
networks in martial environment and other security sensitive usages have made the security a basic 
  
requirement for these networks. Because nodes participate in the routing process, they can destroy the 
network. As routing is based on some kind of trust between nodes, it provides a good chance for attackers to 
disorder routing process. As these networks are formed without any pre plan and for a short period; therefore, 
the security in these networks is investigated separately. One of the most famous attacks is Black Hole attack. 
A black hole is a malicious node that replies for any route requests without having any active route to specified 
destinations and purges all the receiving packets. In addition, in black Hole, attacker nodes tend to advertise 
and spread fake routes, absorb network traffic towards their selves and drop packets. Fig. 1. Shows an 
example of black hole attack. 
 
 
Fig. 1. MANETs with wormhole attack. 
 
basic concepts and preliminaries including DSR routing protocol, black hole attack and artificial immune 
system are provided in Sects. 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 discusses the related works. The proposed 
approach is given in Sect. 6. Performance evaluation are presented in Sect. 7 and finally Sect. 8 concludes the 
paper. 
2. DSR ROUTING PROTOCOL 
DSR routing protocol follows the basic, When RREQ process is sent, the node waits for RREP and once the 
RREPs come from the nodes, it responses to the first arrived RREP (Fig. 2). The node sends packets with this 
RREP, which in turn leads to ignoring other REEPs. Such a process leads to ignoring the security or in security 
of the route, which in turn enhance the chance of malicious nodes (black hole nodes) existence eliminating 
the transmitted packets. To avoid these types of attacks in the network, a method based on table and count 
hope, imitating the artificial immune system, is used. Through this process, we demand for a route and wait 
for the node response to transmit the packets. Once a large number of RREPs are received in a successive time 
period from a node, the packets are not transmitted with this RREP. Rather, information of the given node is 
recorded in a table and, to evaluate the immunity of the route, the hop counts transmitted by RREP are 
analyzed. In the case RREP hop counts are less, for instance there exists a node with high RREPs and also less 
  
hop counts, the given node is labeled as suspicious in the table and its information is broadcasted to the 
neighboring nodes , that node is eliminated from operation cycle (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig. 2. DSR Route Request (RREQ) 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. DSR Route Reply (RREP) 
 
The black hole attack should enter to broadcast group to be able to separate the packs from the multicast. 
This kind of attack deletes some or the entire recipient packs instead of sending them and consequently it 
makes the result of packet delivery rate low. Black hole attack is divided into two groups: single black hole 
attack is applied via one of the existence nodes in the network and total black hole attack that corporates 
together for an attack more than one node [4]. The node, which executes the black hole attack, waits to receive 
a RREQ. With the receipt of this RREQ, the invader node without regarding its routing list or even considering 
any path to the destination, answers positively to that recipient RREQ and makes sending this RREP shorter 
than other nodes. The invader node cheats the node, which sends the RREQ by putting the most number of 
  
sequences and the least number of hops in the RREP. The node which sends the RREQ supposes that it has 
found the best path when receiving this RREP. Therefore, this node is considered as a short and fit path to 
send the packet. Because of that a black hole is created and each node- which is known as a black hole instead 
of sending the packets to destination gets their data or throws them away. The attack node does not check its 
routing list, so it answers to the RREQ node before the other nodes. If the attack node introduces itself as a fit 
path for the total network nodes and succeed to gain all network traffic, so it can destroy all network paths 
and prepare a DOS attack [5] (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Fig. 4. DSR Route Reply (RREP) 
 
3. THE ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE SYSTEM 
In general, the artificial immune systems (AIS) [1 and 6] are categorized on inspired algorithms from the 
biology. As the name would imply, these kinds of algorithms are computer based algorithms which their 
features and principles are the result of close examination in both adaptive characteristics 3 and the 
resistance of biological samples4. Samples of such algorithms are brain-inspired neurotic networks, as well 
as artificial immune system, which make use of principles and natural immune system processes to solve 
problems. 
3.1. Immunity 
In this section, the immune principles would be insinuated in such a way that will facilitate understanding 
the rest of paper and we avoid giving excess details. This section is beginning with a short summery about 
intrinsic immune system. The intrinsic immune system has not been used extensively in artificial systems, 
however, due to assisting the performance of acquisitive immune system and affecting it and the usage of it 
in this paper, having a short review regarding that seems necessary.  
3.2. Intrinsic immunity 
  
As the name would suggest, the intrinsic immune system would last not change over time and been 
adjusted for detecting a small number of common aggressors. The intrinsic immune system will diminish 
most of pathogens (which are the potential detrimental aggressors) at its first clash. The acquisitive immune 
system is in desperate needs of time to response against aggressors, so it is the intrinsic immune system 
responsibility to react against the aggressors immediately and bring the attack under its control  so as to 
the acquisitive immune system could give an influential response [1]. 
3.3. The acqustive immunity 
When the intrinsic immunity is made active, its activity would last for several days while the time the 
acquisitive immunity is active, it would even endure for weeks. The acquisitive immunity is obliged to destroy 
the pathogens in case the intrinsic immunity has been defeated or is infeasible anyway. Inapplicability of the 
intrinsic immunity is due to its incapability to build a specific response for an aggressor pathogen; in this 
point, it is the acquisitive immune system, which takes the field. Unlike the intrinsic immunity, the acquisitive 
immunity is specific and has memory, according to Fig. 5, it can remember the pathogen which has attacked 
one time and system generated a response for it, therefore in future encounters it can respond quickly to 
oppose it. 
 
Fig. 5. DSR Route Reply (RREP) 
Response of Y2 is stronger than X2. The first sign for existence of such unknown antigens in T1 produces X2 
response. Nevertheless, notice the delay between T1 & X1. Nearly The same antigens been interred in the 
time of T2, almost immediately in produced response of Y1 for acquisitive system can be observed in 
vaccination experiments carried out by Jenner in 1970 [1 and 8]. 
3.4. B-cell, antibody and immunoglobulin 
Like all immune cells, B cells are developed in bone marrow. A natural B cell contains 105 antibodies 
(receptor) on its surface. Each one of these antibodies has a unique shape that can be found in genetic 
structure of B cell and as a result they have a shape similar to B cell. Therefore all antibodies produced through 
a B cell are connected to a similar set of molecular models. According to figure 4, antibodies of B cell are dual- 
  
value and dual- performance. They are dual-value because of their capability for connecting to two antigens 
through two arms in Fab areas, and they are called dual- performance due to the fact that besides having the 
capability for connecting to antigen models using Fab areas, they can also be connected to certain receptors 
on surface of other immune cells using Fc portion [2 and 7]. 
 
Fig. 6. B-cell, antibody and immunoglobulin 
There are copious antibodies on the surface of B-cell. In Fig. 6, an antibody (Ab), or an immunoglobulin (Ig), 
is consisted of two similar light chains (L) and two similar heavy chains (H). 
 
 
Fig. 7. Antibody molecule and its genome 
4. RELATED WORKS 
Computer networks are threatened by many security attacks such as modification, denial of service attack, 
fabrication attack, IP spoofing, etc. Therefore, a lot of research has been done in this regard [9–15]. 
Rutvij et al. [16] proposed a technique which makes use of AODV protocol to detect Black Hole attack. In 
this work, a dynamic node calculates a peak value for every time interval. The peak value calculates RREP 
sequence number, routing table sequence number and number of replies received during a particular time 
interval. These values are calculated for every time interval and in this way the attacks are calculated 
dynamically. According to their algorithm when an intermediate node receives RREP packets having higher 
  
sequence number than the peak value that node are marked as malicious node. Further the other nodes in 
the routing path get the details about malicious node information and isolate that vulnerable node from the 
network. 
Su [17] proposed an intrusion detection technique called an Anti-Black Hole Mechanism (ABM) which 
employs two additional tables known as RREQ (RQ) table and Sniff Node (SN) table. RQ table maintains all 
the values of RREQ messages within the transmission range of the node, whereas SN table records the 
suspicious nodes within its transmission range. The value of the suspicious node is calculated by identifying 
the forwarded message of intermediate node. 
A methodology for identifying multiple black hole nodes cooperating as a group with slightly modified 
AODV protocol by introducing Data Routing Information (DRI) Table and Cross Checking was proposed [17]. 
Simulation of this method was implemented in [18].  
Authors added some changes to the algorithm to enhance the accuracy in preventing the black hole attacks. 
They suggested checking the current intermediate node for black hole if the next hop was not reliable. 
Intrusion detection in sensor networks was studied and a lightweight distributed scheme was proposed [19].  
Su [20] extended several intrusion detection system nodes in MANETs in order to detect and prevent 
selective black hole attacks. A selective black hole is a node which may optionally and alternately do a black 
hole attack or act as a normal node. The IDS nodes are set in sniff mode in order to estimate the suspicious 
values of nodes according to the abnormal difference between the routing messages transmitted from the 
nodes. In case of exceeding threshold, a near IDS asks all nodes on the network to cooperatively isolate the 
malicious node. The value of the threshold plays an important role in this study. In the proposed method, 
nodes monitor their neighbourhood and collaborate with their nearest neighbours to return the network 
back to its normal operational condition. The authors applied their scheme for the black hole and selective 
forwarding attacks. 
In [21], to overcome the black hole attack, authors proposed to ignore the first RREP packet reaching the 
source node. They implemented this solution by implementing RREP packet caching mechanism. A cluster-
based scheme to prevent black hole attacks in MANETs was presented in [22], which elects cluster heads to 
prevent black hole attacks. Then the authors proposed a cluster-based countermeasure to prevent the black 
hole attacks by identifying those black hole nodes. In another clustering black hole attack detection and 
prevention approach, each member of a cluster ping the cluster head to detect the peculiar difference 
between the numbers of data packets received and forwarded by the node. If anomalousness is detected, all 
the nodes will delete the malicious nodes from the network [23]. 
Araghi et al. [24] provided a solution to prevent the black hole attack. In this study the basic authentication 
of intermediate nodes that send the path response message but get the confirmation from the destination 
was reviewed. If the confirmation is not received from the destination, these malicious intermediate nodes 
will be saved for arbitration at a later time. CL parameter is a counter that shows the miss behaviour of 
intermediate nodes when they send a wrong path response. If CL becomes more than 3 for each node, that 
  
node is considred as malicious and the path introduced by this node is avoided.  
In [25], an efficient approach for detection and removal of single and cooperative black hole attacks in 
MANET was presented. The algorithm not only detects the black hole nodes in case when the node is not idle 
but it can also detect the black hole nodes in case when a node is idle as well. To check if a node is idle, the 
authors used a threshold for the Interval. In case of exceeding the threshold, the malicious procedure is 
invoked. For this, a source node looks at its route cache, then sends RREQ packets, and waits for the replies. 
Based on the replies, the black hole detection procedure is called. In this method, RREQ packets are sent in 
Fibonacci series pattern until the Flow count Threshold (which is set to 34 ms) is not reached. 
Madadian et al. [26] proposed a method to detect black hole attacks. In this method, when a node sends 
the path response package, a consultation process takes place around that node. Then, according to the 
comments by neighbor nodes, a decision is made about the maliciousness of the responsive node. One method 
to detect the black hole attack using a timer was presented.  
Mandala [27] proposed new black hole attacks, namely Independent Hybrid Black Hole Attack (IHBHA) 
and Cooperative Hybrid Black Hole Attack (CHBHA); and then measures the severity of both CBA and HBHAs. 
Considering the principles and characteristics of the active black hole attacks, an effective approach which 
can detect and defend active black hole attacks was proposed by improving the AODV routing protocol 
combining flow analysis [28]. 
Another method called CDSM (Code Division SecurityMethod) based on code division to avoid the black 
hole attack was proposed [29] as well. Moreover, some methods to avoid the black hole attacks were 
compared in [30]. Filling gaps in measuring the severity of this attack, 
Another approach was proposed to detect black hole nodes in the MANET. In the proposed method, as soon 
as detecting a misbehaving node, the detecting node tries to avoid the misbehaving node [31]. 
5. THE PROPOSED APPROACH (AIS-DSR) 
In this section, we design a black hole-immune routing protocol by jointly employing the artificial immune 
system. 
5.1. Proposed AIS-based Defense scheme against black hole attack 
In order to make computer networks intelligent, we can make use of existing knowledge in the nature. One 
of these systems is the artificial immune system inspired by the human's immune system mechanism, which 
is an effective solution for convoluted predicaments in computer networks, such as in misbehavior detection 
or various attacks. In DSR routing protocol, once the first RREP is received by the source node, the packets 
will be transmitted to the destination node. This shortest route path approach, disregards route's security. In 
this paper, we do not send immediately packets toward the destination node, upon the first RREP reception. 
Rather, source node considers entire received PREPs and then selects the most secure route by using the 
artificial immune system. General concept of this process is like a human being immune system, where 
antibodies are trained to detect and eliminate malicious antigens. To this end, the proposed approach 
  
develops and updates a set of conditions that could detect the routes infected by black hole attackers and 
abstain from selecting them. As shown in Fig. 8, the proposed scheme has different steps. In the steps, as 
discussed in section Step 1, the AIS is used to select immune routes. 
 
Fig. 8. Flowchart training of the detectors. 
 
Step 1: Initialization 
In this step, for each route that received RREP would be examined in terms of security. For this purpose, a 
test packet will be sent over each route and the destination node should send a confirmation packet. 
Obviously, if a route has a malicious node, the test packet would not reach to the destination and therefore 
confirmation packet would not be received. In this case, the probability of being a malicious node in the route 
will increased. The test packet will be sent three times to increase accuracy of the initialization step. 
Step 2: AIS-base detection 
As mentioned, the black hole attack shows hop count much lower than actual amount; so, in the case of 
having smaller hop count by a route, the probability of infection of this route would be increased. In similar 
manner, a route that has been infected by black hole attacker. Therefore, the desirable route is a route, which 
based on Equation (1), maximizes Fr  indicator. 
 
  
𝐹𝑟 (𝐻𝑂𝑃. 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =  (
ℎ𝑜𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑥 ℎ𝑜𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
) + (
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃
𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃
)       (1) 
 
In order to combine results obtained from Step 1 and Step 2, considering metric security and effic
iency, general an indicator of route selection obtains from following Equation (2).                 
        
Definition 1 (𝑃𝑏ℎ(𝑟)) In this paper, a variable, termed as the route infection probability, is used to detect 
malicious nodes.  
 
𝑆𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 =  (1 − 𝑃𝑏ℎ(𝑟)) ∗ 𝐹𝑟 (𝐻𝑂𝑃. 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) (2) 
Algorithm (1), shows training of detectors in which it is teaching a set of antibodies in order to be resistant 
with a set of self-antigens for the purpose of being supported to defend against non-self-antigen (black hole 
attack). 
Algorithm 1: For training the detectors (add in the step to the detector set) 
1: Input   : S = set of patterns to be recognized,  
n the number of worst  elements to select for removal 
2: Output : M = set of memory detectors capable of classifying unseen patterns 
3: Begin 
4:  Create an initial random set of antibodies, A  
5: For All  patterns in S   do          
6: Determine the affinity with each antibody in A  
7: Generate clones of a subset of the antibodies in A with the highest affinity.  
8: The number of clones for an antibody is proportional to its affinity              
9: Mutate attributes of these clones to the set A , and place a copy of the highest affinity 
antibodies in A  into the memory set, M 
11: Replace the n lowest affinity antibodies in A with new randomly generated antibodies 
12: End  
13: End  
 
According to Algorithm 2. For every route. Algorithm 2 are calculated and that route is selected as the most 
immune route, which has a bigger number meaning Hop and Iteretauion. 
 
 
  
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this part, we evaluate the performance of the proposed approach (AIS-DSR) in the problem of prevention 
black hole attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
approach (AIS-DSR) in the problem of prevention black hole attack 
A. Performance metrics 
We conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of our AIS-DSR approach 
and compare it with DSR under black hole attack [32, 33 and 34]. We evaluate the throughput, end-to-end 
delay, packets loss ratio and packets drop ratio. 
 
1. Throughput 
Throughput is the number of data packets delivered from source to destination per unit of time. 
Throughput is calculated as received throughput in bit per second at the traffic destination. The throughput 
is calculated in Equation (1) follows: [35, 36 and 37]. 
Algorithm 2: For selecting immune route 
Input:      𝑃𝑏ℎ(𝑟))   for all routes 
Output:   An immune route 
Begin 
Procedure Selecting 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 
 R = number of routes 
 For r = 1     To R 
If  Pm  > 0.5       Then     reject 
Else if  𝐹𝑟  ( HOPCount, ITR)   =
ℎ𝑜𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑥 ℎ𝑜𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
+
max 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑝
 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑃
 
Select   the route   with   maximum   ROUTE i = (1 - Pm) * Fr (HOP 
COUNT ,ITR RREP)  
End if 
End if 
End procedure 
  
 
 
(
∑ 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑗=1
∑ 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑗=1
) 
(1) 
 
2. End to end delay 
This is the average delay between the sending of packets by the source and its receipt by the receiver. This 
includes all possible delays caused during data acquisition, route discovery, queuing, processing at 
intermediate nodes, retransmission delays at the MAC, propagation time, etc. It is measured in milliseconds. 
The lower value of end-to-end delay means the better performance of the protocol. The end-to-end delay is 
calculated in Equation (2) follows: [37, 38 and 39]. 
 
(
∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑛𝑗=1 ∑ 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 
𝑛
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑗=1
) 
(2) 
3. Packet lost rate 
Packet loss occurs when one or more packets of data traveling across a computer network fail to reach their 
destination. Packet loss is typically caused by network congestion. Packet loss is measured as a percentage of 
packets lost with respect to packets sent. The lower value of the packet loss means the better performance of 
the protocol. The PLR is calculated in Equation (3) follows: 
 
𝑃𝐿𝑅 =  (
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑗=1
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑗=1
) ∗ 100 
(3) 
 
4. Drop packet rate 
Dropping packets, where malicious nodes drop packets and end up never forwarding them to a valid next 
hop. Thus, we can define DPR as shown in Equation (4) [39 and 40]. 
 
𝐷𝑃𝑅 = (
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑗=1
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑗=1
) ∗ 100 
(4) 
B. Simulation results and analysis 
We have implemented AIS-DSR approached in the NS-2 on Fedora 10. The simulation parameters are given 
in Table I. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 1. Simulation Parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 compares the performance of AIS-DSR with that of DSR under black hole attacks for detection of the 
black hole attacks. As shown in the figure, AIS-DSR increases the throughput by more than 20% over than 
DSR under attacks, respectively. 
 
Fig. 9. Throughput vs. pause time 
As in As shown in the Fig. 9, when there are destructive nodes in the network, the proposed algorithm by 
Parameters Value 
Channel Type Channel/Wireless channel 
Publication Type Two ray ground 
Network Interface Wireless Phy 
Antenna Omni Antenna 
Simulation Area (m x m) 1000 X 1000 
MAC layer MAC/802.11 
Traffic Type CBR 
Queue Type Drop Tail 
Number of nodes 100 
Primary energy 10 Jules 
Threshold 0.5  Jules 
Time simulation 200 s 
  
low end-to-end delay can identify the destructive nodes and aware another nodes, but DSR protocols are 
disable because it has more end-to-end delay. 
 
Fig. 10. End to end delay vs. pause time 
 DSR protocol has lost more packets than a AIS-DSR approach and it shows the success of destructive nodes 
in operating the attack of black hole on this protocol. In general, because of rules and computation of the 
proposed method for identifying the destructive nodes, the loss of packet rate in the proposed algorithm 
decreases compared to DSR protocol (Fig. 10). 
 
Fig. 11. Lost packets vs. pause time 
Finally, Fig. 12 displays the dropped packets in the network. The proposed AIS-DSR technique drops a 
minimal number of packets compared to the other technique. 
 
  
 
Fig. 12. Drop packets vs. pause time 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed an approach for detecting black hole nodes in MANETs based on the artificial 
immune system. First, the artificial immune system was employed to develop a learning approach to detect 
and bypass the black hole attackers without affecting the overall performance of the MANETs. The aim of the 
proposed algorithm in this paper is that we can identify the isolate node and delete them from routing in 
accordance to the behavior of nodes in the system.  
We compared the efficiency of our defensive scheme i.e. AIS-DSR with DSR under black hole attack. 
Simulation results showed that, in average, the overall performance of AIS-DSR is around 20% better than 
DSR routing protocol in terms of throughput, end to end delay, packet drop ratio and lost packets. In general, 
we can say that the proposed algorithm has better operation against malicious nodes than the DSR protocol. 
In our future work, we plan to devise a mechanism to secure MANETs against the third attack model and 
test it intensively under different network conditions. 
References 
[1] Jamali, S., & Fotohi, R. (2016). Defending against Wormhole Attack in MANET Using an Artificial Immune 
System. New Review of Information Networking, 21(2), 79-100. 
[2] Sarkohaki, F., Fotohi, R., & Ashrafian, V.  (2017). An Efficient Routing Protocol in Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks by using Artificial Immune System. International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and 
Applications (IJACSA), 8(4). http://dx.doi.org/10.14569/IJACSA.2017.080473. 
[3] Fotohi, R., Ebazadeh, Y., & Geshlag, M. S. (2016). A New Approach for Improvement Security against DoS 
Attacks in Vehicular Ad-hoc Network. International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and 
Applications, 7, 10-16. 
[4] Zandiyan, S., Fotohi, R., & Koravand, M. (2016). P-Method: Improving AODV Routing Protocol for Against 
  
Network Layer Attacks in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. International Journal of Computer Science and 
Information Security, 14(6), 95. 
[5] Behzad, S., Fotohi, R., & Dadgar, F. (2015). Defense Against the Attacks of the Black Hole, Gray Hole and 
Wormhole in MANETs Based on RTT and PFT. International Journal of Computer Science and Network 
Solutions (IJCSNS), 3, 89-103. 
[6] Sarkohaki, F., Jamali, S., Fotohi, R., & Balov, J. H. (2012). A Simulative Comparison of DSDV and OLSR 
Routing Protocols. Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 6(12), 373-378. 
[7] Jamali, S., Sarkohaki, F & Fotohi, R. (2013). Providing a fault-tolerant algorithm for on-chip 
interconnection networks. International Research Journal of Applied and Basic Sciences (IRJABS), 4(7), 
1700-1705. 
[8] Fadlullah, Z. M., Taleb, T., Vasilakos, A. V., Guizani, M., & Kato, N. (2010). DTRAB: Combating against 
attacks on encrypted protocols through traffic-feature analysis. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 
(TON), 18(4), 1234-1247. 
[9] Yao, G., Bi, J., & Vasilakos, A. V. (2015). Passive IP traceback: Disclosing the locations of IP spoofers from 
path backscatter. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 10(3), 471-484. 
[10] Yang, H., Zhang, Y., Zhou, Y., Fu, X., Liu, H., & Vasilakos, A. V. (2014). Provably secure three-party 
authenticated key agreement protocol using smart cards. Computer Networks, 58, 29-38. 
[11] Liu, B., Bi, J., & Vasilakos, A. V. (2014). Toward incentivizing anti-spoofing deployment. IEEE Transactions 
on Information Forensics and Security, 9(3), 436-450. 
[12] Jing, Q., Vasilakos, A. V., Wan, J., Lu, J., & Qiu, D. (2014). Security of the Internet of Things: perspectives 
and challenges. Wireless Networks, 20(8), 2481-2501. 
[13] Yan, Z., Zhang, P., & Vasilakos, A. V. (2015). A security and trust framework for virtualized networks and 
software-defined networking. Security and communication networks. 
[14] Attar, A., Tang, H., Vasilakos, A. V., Yu, F. R., & Leung, V. C. (2012). A survey of security challenges in 
cognitive radio networks: Solutions and future research directions. Proceedings of the IEEE, 100(12), 
3172-3186. 
[15] Jhaveri, R. H., Patel, S. J., & Jinwala, D. C. (2012, January). A novel approach for grayhole and blackhole 
attacks in mobile ad hoc networks. In Advanced Computing & Communication Technologies (ACCT), 2012 
Second International Conference on (pp. 556-560). IEEE. 
[16] Su, M. Y. (2011). Prevention of selective black hole attacks on mobile ad hoc networks through intrusion 
detection systems. Computer Communications, 34(1), 107-117. 
[17] Ramaswamy, S., Fu, H., Sreekantaradhya, M., Dixon, J., & Nygard, K. E. (2003, June). Prevention of 
cooperative black hole attack in wireless ad hoc networks. In International conference on wireless 
networks (Vol. 2003, pp. 570-575). 
[18] Weerasinghe, H., & Fu, H. (2007, December). Preventing cooperative black hole attacks in mobile ad hoc 
networks: Simulation implementation and evaluation. In Future generation communication and 
  
networking (fgcn 2007) (Vol. 2, pp. 362-367). IEEE. 
[19] Ioannis, K., Dimitriou, T., & Freiling, F. C. (2007, April). Towards intrusion detection in wireless sensor 
networks. In Proc. of the 13th European Wireless Conference (pp. 1-10). 
[20] Su, M. Y. (2011). Prevention of selective black hole attacks on mobile ad hoc networks through intrusion 
detection systems. Computer Communications, 34(1), 107-117. 
[21] Jain, A. K., & Tokekar, V. (2015, January). Mitigating the effects of Black hole attacks on AODV routing 
protocol in mobile ad hoc networks. In Pervasive computing (ICPC), 2015 international conference on (pp. 
1-6). IEEE. 
[22] Shi, F., Liu, W., Jin, D., & Song, J. (2014). A cluster-based countermeasure against blackhole attacks in 
MANETs. Telecommunication Systems, 57(2), 119-136. 
[23] Rashmi, A. S. (2014). Detection and prevention of black-hole attack in MANETS. International Journal of 
Computer Science Trends and Technology (IJCST)-Volume, 2, 204-209. 
[24] Araghi, T. K., Zamani, M., Manaf, A. B. A., Abdullah, S. M., Bojnord, H. S., & Araghi, S. K. (2013, April). A 
secure model for prevention of black hole attack in wireless mobile ad hoc networks. In 12th WSEAS 
international conference on applied computer and applied computational science, Malaysia. 
[25] Shahabi, S., Ghazvini, M., & Bakhtiarian, M. (2016). A modified algorithm to improve security and 
performance of AODV protocol against black hole attack. Wireless Networks, 22(5), 1505-1511. 
[26] Medadian, M., Yektaie, M. H., & Rahmani, A. M. (2009, November). Combat with Black hole attack in AODV 
routing protocol in MANET. In Internet, 2009. AH-ICI 2009. First Asian Himalayas International Conference 
on (pp. 1-5). IEEE. 
[27] Mandala, S., Jenni, K., Ngadi, M. A., Kamat, M., & Coulibaly, Y. (2014, September). Quantifying the severity 
of blackhole attack in wireless mobile adhoc networks. In International Symposium on Security in 
Computing and Communication (pp. 57-67). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
[28] Gao, H., Wu, R., Cao, M., & Zhang, C. (2014, August). Detection and defense technology of blackhole attacks 
in wireless sensor network. In International Conference on Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel 
Processing (pp. 601-610). Springer International Publishing. 
[29] Ahmad, S. J., Reddy, V. S. K., Damodaram, A., & Krishna, P. R. (2015). Detection of black hole attack using 
code division security method. In Emerging ICT for Bridging the Future-Proceedings of the 49th Annual 
Convention of the Computer Society of India CSI Volume 2 (pp. 307-314). Springer International Publishing. 
[30] Nandini, N., & Aggarwal, R. (2015). Prevention of black hole attack by different methods in MANET. 
Network, 4, 297-300. 
[31] Jaisankar, N., Saravanan, R., & Swamy, K. D. (2010). A novel security approach for detecting black hole 
attack in MANET. Information processing and management, 217-223. 
[32] Fotohi, R., Heydari, R., & Jamali, S. (2016). A Hybrid Routing Method for Mobile ad-hoc Networks. Journal 
of Advances in Computer Research, 7(3), 93-103. 
[33] Fotohi, R., Jamali, S., Sarkohaki, F., & Behzad, S. (2013). An Improvement over AODV Routing Protocol by 
  
Limiting Visited Hop Count. International Journal of Information Technology and Computer Science 
(IJITCS), 5(9), 87. 
[34] Fotohi, R., Jamali, S., & Sarkohaki, F. (2013). Performance Evaluation of AODV, LHC-AODV, OLSR, UL-OLSR, 
DSDV Routing Protocols. International Journal of Information Technology and Computer Science (IJITCS), 
5(10), 21. 
[35] Fotohi, R., & Jamali, S. (2014). A Comprehensive Study on Defense against Wormhole Attack Methods in 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks. International journal of Computer Science & Network Solutions, 2, 37-56. 
[36] Behzad, S., Fotohi, R., & Effatparvar, M. (2013). Queue based job scheduling algorithm for cloud 
computing. International Research Journal of Applied and Basic Sciences ISSN, 3785-3790. 
[37] Fotohi, R., & Effatparvar, M. (2013). A Cluster Based Job Scheduling Algorithm for Grid Computing. 
International Journal of Information Technology and Computer Science (IJITCS), 5(12), 70. 
[38] Behzad, S., Fotohi, R., & Jamali, S. (2013). Improvement over the OLSR Routing Protocol in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks by Eliminating the Unnecessary Loops. International Journal of Information Technology and 
Computer Science (IJITCS), 5(6), 16. 
[39] Fotohi, R., Effatparvar, M., Sarkohaki., F., Behzad., S, Hoseinibalov., J. (2012). "An Improvement over 
Threads Communications on Multi-Core Processors", Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 
6(12), 379-384. 
[40] Jamali, S., & Fotohi, R. (2017). DAWA: Defending against wormhole attack in MANETs by using fuzzy logic 
and artificial immune system. The Journal of Supercomputing, 1-24. 
 
 
[41] Shahram Behzad received his B.Sc. degree in Computer Software Engineering from Islamic 
Azad University, Parsabad Branch and M.Sc. degree in Computer Software Engineering from 
Islamic Azad University, Shabestar Branch, under the supervision of Dr. Shahram Jamali 
Associate Professor University of Mohaghegh Ardabili, From 2013. From 2012 until now, he is a Lecturer in 
the Department of Computer Engineering, IAU University, Iran. His research interests include Computer 
Networks: Mobile and Wireless Ad-hoc Networks, Internet Protocols, Routing  and MAC Layer Protocols, 
Artificial Immune System (AIS). 
 
Reza Fotohi is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, 
Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, IRAN. His research interests include Computer Networks, 
Mobile/Wireless Networks, UAV communications, IoT Security, Blockchain. He has over 8 
years’ research experience in computer networks and mobile/wireless networks. He was also 
the recipient and co-recipient of various awards for research publications. He is author and co-author of more 
than 20 technical journal and conference papers. He is also a member and reviewer in many journals and 
conferences such as IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, IEEE Access, Applied Soft Computing, 
  
Artificial Intelligence Review, Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences, The Journal of 
Supercomputing, Springer, Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing, Wireless Personal 
Communications Journal, National Academy Science Letters, Springer, Journal of Grid Computing, KSII 
Transactions on Internet and Information Systems, IET Signal Processing, International Journal of 
Communication Systems, Iranian Journal of Fuzzy Systems (IJFS), and The Turkish Journal of Electrical 
Engineering & Computer Sciences (ISI-JCR). His papers have more than 517 citations with 16 h-index and 21 
i10-index. 
 
 
Jaber hosseini balov received his B.Sc. degree in Computer Software Engineering Technology 
from Urmia Academic Center for Education, Culture and Research (ACECR) and M.Sc. degree 
in Information technology and Management from Jo nko ping University in Sweden, under the 
supervision of Professor Anders Carstensen Associate Professor Computer Science in 
Jo nko ping University. From 2012 until now, he is a Lecturer in the Department of Computer Engineering, 
Urmia University of Applied Science and Technology in IRAN and Jo nko ping High school in Sweden. 
 
Mohammad javad Rabipour received his B.Sc. degree in Electrical Engineering, 
Communication from Najafabad Branch, Islamic Azad University, and M.Sc. degree in 
Electrical Engineering, Communication Systems from Kashan Branch, Islamic Azad 
University, under the supervision of Professor Hossein Ghasvari Associate Professor 
Electrical Engineering, Communication in Kashan Branch, Islamic Azad University, IRAN. 
